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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20010396-CA

vs.
DALE DEMONT HARDY
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from convictions on one count of violating a protective
order, a class A misdemeanor, and two counts of violating a protective order, third
degree felonies, all in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-108 (1999), in the
Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.,
presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(2001).
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ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the evidence suffice to support the trial court's finding that defendant
violated the terms of his plea in abeyance agreement?
"To mount a successful attack on the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant
must . . . demonstrate that even viewing [the evidence] in the light most favorable
to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings." A'. J.
Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
2. Did the evidence suffice to support the jury's verdict finding defendant
violated a protective order by sending letters intended for his wife, although
addressed to his children?
This Court will reverse a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence "only
when the evidence is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 'reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the
crime." State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State i\
Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (other quotations omitted)).
3. Has defendant waived both his over breadth and his vagueness claims in
Case No. 991200131 ("the misdemeanor case")?
Because this issue arises for the first time on appeal and does not relate to any
action of the trial court, no standard of review applies.

i
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4. Has defendant waived his vagueness claim in Case No. 991200873 ("the
felonies case")?
See standard of review for issue 3.
5. Is the Cohabitant Abuse Act overly broad for prohibitng the subject of a
protective order from "contacting^ or otherwise communicating" with a former
cohabitant?
This is a legal question reviewed for correctness with no deference accorded to
the trial court. See. e.g., Prow City Corp. v. Willden* 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah
1989) (constitutional challenges to statute were questions of law reviewed for
correctness).
6. Is the Cohabitant Abuse Act unconstitutionally vague for prohibiting the
subject of a protective order from "contacting^ or otherwise communicating" with
a former cohabitant?
This is also legal question reviewed for correctness.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant statutes and rules are included in Addendum A:
§ 30-6-2 (1996);
§ 30-6-4.2 (2001);
§ 76-5-108 (1999);
§ 77-2a-3 (1995);
§ 77-2a-4 (1993);
§ 77-36-1.1 (1999); and
Utah R. Cnm. P. 12(d).
UTAH CODE
UTAH CODE
UTAHCODE
UTAH CODE
UTAHCODE
UTAHCODE

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Case No. 99/200/31 ("the misdemeanor case")
On January 8, 1999, Judge Leslie Lewis granted Courtnev Hardv's petition for
an ex parte protective order based on Ms. Hardy's allegation that defendant, then
her husband, had physically abused her. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. The order prohibited
defendant "from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning, or
otherwise communicating with the Petltioner.,, Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. Officer Victor
Siebeneck served defendant with the order later that day. Id. Defendant was
charged with violation of the protective order based on information that he
telephoned Ms. Hardy three times within a thirty-minute period on January 9, the
day after he was served. R. (Pleadings 131) 2.1
On April 6, 1999, defendant pled guilty. R. (Pleadings 131) 11. Judge Joseph
C. Fratto agreed to hold defendant's plea in abeyance on the condition that
defendant commit no further violations. Id.
On October 6, 1999, the State filed an affidavit in support of an order to show
cause, alleging that defendant had violated the terms of his plea in abeyance
agreement. R. (Pleadings 131) 13. An evidentiary hearing was held on July 12.
2000, before Judge Michael K. Burton, who found that defendant had violated the

Because the record for this consolidated appeal contains a separate pleadings
volume for each case, citations to the pleadings indicate the final three digits of the
relevant case number.
4
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i

terms of the plea in abeyance agreement and set sentencing before Judge Fratto. R.
(Pleadings 131) 50; T. 177:29.
On August 31, 2000, defendant moved to withdraw his plea, alleging that he
would not have pled guilty had he known the State would file additional charges
based on other incidents. R. (Pleadings 131) 56; T. 178:7. Judge Fratto denied the
motion. R. (Pleadings 131) 56-57, T. 178:8. On March 13, 2001, Judge Fratto
sentenced defendant to a jail term of 365 days.2 R. (Pleadings 131) 67; T. 94:1617. Defendant then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. R. (Pleadings
131) 70-72. Judge Fratto summarily denied the motion, and defendant timely
appealed. R. (Pleadings 131) 73-74.
Case No. 991200873 ("thefelonies case")
Following a January 25, 1999, hearing at which defendant was present. Judge
Tyrone E. Medley granted Ms. Hardy's petition for a permanent protective order.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 2. Like the original ex parte order, the permanent order
prohibited defendant "from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning,
or otherwise communicating with [Ms. Hardy)." Id.

"Judge Fratto ordered that this sentence am concurrently with defendant's sentence
in the felonies case.
This permanent protective order was an extension of the temporary ex parte order
granted by Judge Lewis about two weeks earlier.
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Defendant was charged by information with five misdemeanor and two felony
counts based on his violation of both protective orders. R. (Pleadings 873) 1-3, 5156. The felony counts were based on letters addressed to defendant's children and
sent to Ms. Hardy's address on or about June 7 and June 24, 1999, following
defendant's conviction in the misdemeanor case. Id.; see also Plaintiffs Exhibits
10, 11.

-..-..

These counts were tried before a jury. T. 178:10-212. Defendant claimed at
the close of the State's case that the protective orders were unconstitutionally
overbroad because they prohibited conduct that was not dangerous and that they
inappropriately infringed on defendant's First Amendment rights. T. 178:140. Id.
Defendant therefore moved to dismiss. R. 178:135. Judge Fratto denied this
motion. T. 178:141.
Defendant was acquitted on the misdemeanor counts, but found guilty on the
felony counts.4 R. (Pleadings 873) 121-127; T. 178:206-207. Judge Fratto
sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term not to exceed five years on
each count and ordered that the terms run concurrently. R. (Pleadings 873): 156157, T. 179:16-17. Defendant then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment.

4

Because the June 7 and June 24 communications followed defendant's conviction
for violating the January 8 protective order, the new offenses were enhanced by one
degree pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. $ 77-36-1.1 ( 1999).
6
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R. (Pleadings 873) 159-161. Judge Fratto summarily denied that motion, and
defendant timely appealed. R. (Pleadings 873) 162-163.
The misdemeanor and felonies cases were subsequently consolidated for
purposes of appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On January 8, 1999, Courtney Hardy sought an ex parte protective order,
alleging, in part, that defendant had thrown her down the stairs and out of the house
into the snow. R. 178:167-169, 180. The court granted the order which excluded
defendant from Ms. Hardy's residence and prohibited him from "directly or
indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning, or otherwise communicating with
[her].,, Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. Officer Victor Siebeneck served the order at the
residence, told defendant he would have to leave, and allowed him to gather his
belongings. T. 178:65-67. Officer Siebeneck also explained the provisions of the
protective order prohibiting defendant's direct or indirect contact or communication
with Ms. Hardy. T. 178:67-69. He advised defendant "that he could have no
contact directly, indirectly, through third party, letters, phone calls, in any way. No
communication with her whatsoever." T. 178:69. The following day, defendant
called Ms. Hardy at least three times within a thirty-minute period. See R.
(Pleadings 131) 2.

7
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A permanent protective order issued on January 25, 1999. Following issuance
of that order, defendant sent about four letters to Ms. Hardy with his children. See
T. 178:77; Plaintiffs Exhibits 3, 4, 6, 7, 8. On March 10, 1999, Officer EIna
Alofipo contacted defendant, who denied having sent the letters. T. 178:75-76.
She told him to read the protective order again *'so that he [did] not violate it
again." T. 178:77.
Between March and June, 1999. defendant also sent several letters to his
children at Ms. Hardy's address. See Plaintiffs Exhibits 5 (Mar. 5, 1999), 10 (June
7, 1999), 1 I (June 24, 1999); T. 178:84-86. The State argued that these letters
were, in fact, intended for Ms. Hardy. T. 177:22-23; T. 178:56, 193-194. At the
time, defendant's oldest child, who suffered from a form of autism, was eight.
T. 178:84-85. The other three children were six, three, and one. T. 178:85. Ms.
Hardy testified that the reading ability of the two older children was very limited
and that the younger two did not read at all. T. 178:85-86. Two of these letters
contained mature content, and Ms., Hardy testified that even the older two children
could not have understood the content. R. 178:113, 116.
The following excerpts are from the June 7 letter:
My Dearest Ones, It has been five months since Mommy and I talked. I have
not a[r]gued since. I discovered something . . . There are very few people that
really know me because they have not taken the time to have a conversation
with me. fm not talking about talking at. to me—Hello good[-]by stuff. But
really converse like Mommy and I did, although I feel that I attempted to get
to know her, I feel that she did not know me well enough, but I al[]ways
(

8
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wanted her to. She seemed to have too much to do when I needed to talk
she was tired . . . .
I still believe that your Mommy would trust me and like me if she would
converse with me—That is why I wanted her to go with me on the
cruise. . . . I think I may have scared Mommy when I said that these
children are Heavenly Father's not ours and that by saying things about
her staying somewhere while we went—This made her feel 1 would take
you away . . . .
I was a h[y]pocrit[e] and I hurt your Mommy and do not deserve her
forgiveness—[b]ut she is not the type of person that holds a grudge
forever. I know too how she feels now by my threats to leave or make
her leave you children and I do not deserve to see you again. I am so
very sorry and will spend my life making it up to her and you some way.
Please know that I was not aware o( the pain I caused your Mommy.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 10. The letter also contained a recipe for stuffed trout, hi.
Hardy testified that none of her children cooked. T. 178:114.
These excerpts are from the June 24 letter:
I only wish I knew what I have done to have you treat me this way.
You might say, someday, that this is all my fault, but I don't see what 1
could have done. I can change and do things differently in the future and
forget the past. But how do I forget my own tlesh & blood and my wife
that I thought wanted me like I need her?
I remember how hurt I felt when Mommy stayed away all night and how
I wanted her to see you and never leave again. I have now had nearly six
months of this yet I cannot understand why one person would want to
hurt another person this way. I am too naive or dumb to "get it". One o'i
Mommy's friends even said "get a lite" to me. Just how do 1 do that?
Please forgive me someday and phone or send pictures of you and
especially Mommy if you can. I can not help being in love and I know
that someday you will understand me if you take time to be with
me—learn to talk instead of T.V
0
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Plaintiffs Exhibit 11.
Defendant testified that no one had said anything to him about writing letters.
T. 178:152. He stated that he simply understood the protective orders to prohibit
threats, harassment, or turning off the phone. T. 178:152. He claimed that he
understood only that he could not threaten Ms. Hardy and that he could not
telephone her all. T. 178:170-173.
Defendant testified that he never intended to violate the protective orders and
did not know that he was violating them. T. 178:157, 160, 166. Further, defendant
testified that none of his letters to his children were, in fact, directed to Ms. Hardy.
See, e.g., R. 178:162. He testified that he included the mature content in his letters,
including the trout recipe, because he thought it was a way for his children to
preserve what was happening to him. T. 178:162. He was, as it were, sending
them copies of his journal so that they could keep track of what he was thinking
and doing. T. 178:164.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Evidence was presented showing both that the children could not read and that
the letters addressed to them contained mature content that they could not have
understood—content addressing past marital discord and implicitly laying blame.
That evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference and therefore a
fin-dine that defendant's letters addressed to his children were, in fact, letters to Ms.

10
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Hardy. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the district court's
finding that defendant had violated the terms ot his plea in abeyance agreement and
the jury's finding that he had violated the terms of the protective orders enjoining
any contact or communication.
Defendant has preserved his over breadth challenge to his felony convictions
in Case No. 991200873. But he has not preserved his over breadth claim in
connection with the violation of his plea in abeyance agreement in Case No.
991200131, and he has not preserved his vagueness challenge in either case.
In any event, the challenged statute and protective orders were neither overly
broad nor unconstitutionally vague. They were carefully tailored to restrain
behavior that was or could become abusive and to prohibit unwanted
communications.
Further, they were not unconstitutionally vague. They gave adequate notice o(
what was prohibited. Because they provided explicit standards to guide police
officers, judges, and juries, they were not subject to arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. Finally, they were not vague as applied to defendant. Defendant
knew that communication with Ms. Hardy was prohibited. He was convicted for
intentionally communicating with her in violation of the terms of the applicable
protective orders, not for communicating about her.

11
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ARGUMENT
I.
EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE TERMS OF HIS
PLEA IN ABEYANCE IN THE MISDEMEANOR CASE
Defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he
intended the June 7 and June 24 letters for Vis. Hardy and was therefore insufficient
to show that he directly or indirectly contacted or otherwise communicated with her.
Br. Aplt. at 27-30. Hence, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
the trial court's finding that he was writing to his wife in violation of the terms of
his plea in abeyance in the misdemeanor case. Id. The evidence, however,
sufficed.
Reduced to its essence, defendant's argument is a challenge to the trial court's
findings of fact and to the inferences the trial court drew from the facts. "To mount
a successful attack on the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must marshal all
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even
viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient
to support the findings;' K. J. Scharfv. BUG Corp.. ~00 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah
1985). Further, "it is the province of the trier of fact to determine which testimony
and facts to believe and what inferences to draw from those facts." State v. Reed.
839 P.2d 878, 879 (Utah App. 1992).
I
12
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When a court receives information that a defendant has violated his plea in
abeyance agreement, the court may order the defendant to appear and "show cause
why the court should not find the terms of the agreement have been violated and
why the agreement should not be terminated."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-2a-4( 1)

(1993). "If, following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the defendant has
failed to substantially comply with any term or condition of the plea in abeyance
agreement, it may terminate the agreement and enter judgment for the offense to
which the original plea was entered." Id.
On January 27, 1999, the State filed a domestic violence information charging
defendant with the January 9, 1999 violation of the ex-parte protective order issued
and served the day before. R. (Pleadings 131)1-2. On April 6, 1999, defendant
entered a guilty plea to violating a protective order. R. (Pleadings 131) 11-12. The
plea was held in abeyance on the condition that defendant commit no further
violations. Id.
In June, 1999, while defendant was subject to a permanent protective order
proscribing any contact or communication with his estranged wife, defendant wrote
two letters addressed to his children at the residence they shared with her. See
Plaintiffs Exhibits 10, 11. Based on that and other information, the prosecutor
moved to have the plea in abeyance agreement terminated, alleging that defendant

13
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had committed eleven new violations of his protective order. R. (Pleadings
131): 13.
The trial court ordered defendant to appear and show cause why his guilty plea
should not be entered. R. (Pleadings 131): 16. At the evidentiary hearing held July
12, 2000, the State introduced the June 7 and June 24 letters. T. 93:10, 12. Ms.
Hardy testified at that hearing that the oldest of her four children was eight at the
time and had a form of autism. T. 93:11. The other three children were six and
under. T. 93:10-11. None of the children read at the time they received the letters.
T. 93:12. The State argued that the letters were intended for Ms. Hardy and that
defendant was trying to "get around the court [o]rder to not talk to her by just
simply addressing [them] to the kids." T. 93:22-23. Defendant argued that the
letters were for the children. T. 93:28. The tnal judge, after reviewing the content
of the letters, found it "clear" that defendant was, in fact, writing to Ms. Hardy, and
that the State had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had
violated his plea in abeyance agreement. T. 93:28-29. The trial judge reasonably
inferred from the evidence before him that the letters, while addressed to
defendant's children, were actually intended for Ms. Hardy.
The content of the letters—the focus on mantai problems, the references to
prior mantai conversations, and the implicit accusations of biame—together with
testimony regarding the children's ages and inability to read more than suffice to

14
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support the court's finding that defendant intended the letters for Ms. Hardy, even
though he addressed them to his children. Accordingly, the evidence also suffices
to support the trial court's determination that defendant violated the terms o( his
plea in abeyance agreement.
II.
EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S GUILTY
VERDICT IN THE FELONIES CASE
Defendant makes a similar insufficiency claim with respect to the jury verdict
in the felonies case. Br. Aplt. at 21-27. He argues that the evidence produced at
trial, essentially the same as that produced in the evidentiary' hearing in the
misdemeanor case, was insufficient to show that he intended to communicate with
his wife and was therefore insufficient to show that he intentionally violated his
protective order. Again, the evidence sufficed.
"When reviewing a jury verdict, we examine the evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v.
Kruger, 2000 UT 60, «1 2, 6 P.3d 1116 (emphasis added).
At trial, the jury heard evidence of the children's ages and their inability to
read. T. 178:85-86. The June 7 and June 24 letters were entered into evidence and
their mature content highlighted. T. 178:112-116. In addition, police officers
testified that on two different occasions they explained to defendant that he could
not write letters to his wife. T. 178:67-60, 76-77.
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The letters and the additional evidence, including the reasonable inferences
that the jury was entitled to draw from them, more than sufficed to support the
jury's verdict and its underlying finding that defendant intended to communicate
with his wife, knowing he was violating the terms of the protective order, when he
sent the June 7 and June 24 letters.
;

' • I I I . ;

•'•••

DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS IN
THE MISDEMEANOR CASE
Defendant argues that the statute authorizing the issuance of protective orders
and the protective orders to which he was subject were unconstitutionally vague and
overly broad. In the misdemeanor case, defendant waived his nght to challenge the
constitutionality of these statutes and the attendant protective orders when he
entered his unconditional guilty plea. By entering an unconditional guilty plea, a
"defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime
charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea
constitutional violations." State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989): see
also Bentley v. West Valley City\ 2001 LT 23, «r 4, 21 P.3d 210.
Further, even if his argument is construed to be a challenge to the finding that
he violated the terms of his plea, defendant has waived his constitutional claims.
Defendant did not raise any constitutional challenge at the evidentiary hearing held
to determine whether he had violated his protective order. See T. 93. Defendant
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<

apparently claims that he preserved the constitutional challenge when he argued,
during his July 12, 2000 jury trial in the felonies case, that the statutory scheme and
protective order were overly broad. See Br. Aplt. at 3. The jury trial, however, did
not address defendant's violation of the terms of his plea agreement. See T. 178.
That determination was made over a month earlier before a different judge." See R.
(Pleadings 131) It; T. 93.
Finally, defendant's motion to alter or amend judgment did not preserve the
claim. The failure to object at a fact finding proceeding, such as a trial or at a

'After Judge Burton found defendant had violated the terms of his plea in abeyance
in the misdemeanor case, he transferred that case to Judge Fratto for sentencing. On the
day of defendant's trial before Judge Fratto in the felonies case, defendant moved to
withdraw his plea in the misdemeanor case. T. 178:3-5. Defendant argued that the
circumstances surrounding the plea agreement were unfair because the State was, at the
time, planning to charge him with additional offenses. T. 178:5-10. The trial court,
uncertain whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the motion, ruled that, even assuming
jurisdiction, defendant had not shown good cause for withdrawal of the plea. T. 178:1 o.
Thus, while this motion in the misdemeanor case is included in the transcript for the jury
trial in the felonies case, defendant's constitutional argument, which followed the
presentation of the State's case in the felonies case, had nothing to do with the
misdemeanor case.
Further, it is not clear that Judge Fratto had jurisdiction to consider the motion to
withdraw. When a defendant pleads guilty, he can generally file a timely motion to
withdraw that plea within thirty days of his sentencing. See State v. Ostler. 2001 I T os.«"
11,31 P.2d 528. However, the statutory provisions governing the withdrawal of a pica in
abeyance contemplate that it shall only be withdrawn upon a finding that a defendant has
successfully completed the terms of the agreement. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 7>2a-3
(1995). Otherwise, a defendant may enter into a plea in abeyance agreement, violate the
agreement, have the plea entered and sentence imposed, and then move to withdraw his
plea, a scenario not contemplated in Ostler, 2001 I T 68,1 9,10. In any event, defendant
does not challenge the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea on appeal.
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hearing on an order to show cause, generally waives a claim. See Utah R. Crim. P.
12(d). Where a party's claim of error is first raised in a motion to alter or amend
judgment and when the trial court simply denies the motion without taking evidence
or holding a hearing, the claim is not preserved. See Estate of Covington v.
Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 n.5 (Utah App. 1994); cf. State v. Seale, 853 P.2d
862, 870 (Utah 1993) (issue on appeal "resuscitated when trial court considered
claim first raised in motion for new triaD.
Defendant waived his constitutional claims in the misdemeanor case by
pleading guilty. Even construing defendant's claims as a challenge to the finding
that he violated the terms of his plea in abeyance agreement, the claims are waived.
Defendant did not raise his claims until he filed his motion to alter or amend
judgment. The claims were untimely. The trial court did not hold an evidentiary
hearing or address the merits of the claims. Defendant waived the claims, the trial
court did not resuscitate them, and the issues are therefore unpreserved.
IV.
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS VAGUENESS CLAIM IN THE
FELONIES CASE
While defendant argued that the statute and protective orders were overly
broad at trial, he did not raise his vagueness challenge in the felonies case until he
filed his motion to alter or amend judgment. For the reasons detailed under Point
III, above, defendant therefore waived this claim.
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v.
NEITHER THE STATUTE NOR THE PROTECTIVE ORDERS
ARE OVERLY BROAD
Defendant argues that the Cohabitant Abuse Act is overly broad because it
permits courts to curtail communications that are "not violent, threatening, abusive
or "fighting words.'" Br. Aplt. at 31; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-4.2 (2001).
Defendant concedes that the legislature may restrict and punish "harassing, violent.
[and] abusive" expression. Id. at 42. He argues, however, that the statute is
facially overly broad because it permits courts to restrict all communication and
contact, even "innocent communication or contact." Id. at 45.
Defendant also argues that the statute is overbroad as applied to him because
"[t]he letters in this case that resulted in a violation of the plea in abeyance and the
two felony convictions do not rise to the level of harassing, violent, obscene,
threatening, or abusive conduct.M Id. at 47. He argues that he has been punished
for conveying "expressions of sorrow, remorse and devotion." Id.
Defendant has preserved his over breadth claim only with respect to his felony
convictions in Case No. 991200873. See Point III, above. In any event,
defendant's over breadth claim fails on the merits in both cases.
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A. Facial over breadth
A statute may be overly broad if "in its reach it prohibits constitutionally
protected conduct," i.e., it "sweeps within its prohibition what may not be punished
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Grayned \\ City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 114-115 (1972). A statute, however, is not overly broad unless it
criminalizes "a substantial amount of constitutionally protected activity." Salt Lake
City v. Lope:, 935 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah App. 199") (emphasis added); see also
Osborne v Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1989) (the over breadth must be real and
substantial in relation to the statute's "plainly legitimate sweep" before the statute
must be declared unconstitutionally over broad). "Even where a statute at its
margins infringes on protected expression, 'facial invalidation is inappropriate if
the remainder of the statute . . . covers a whole range of easily identifiable and
constitutionally proscribable . . . conduct . . . / " Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112
(citation omitted).
The Cohabitant Abuse Act, which authorizes domestic violence protective
orders, is carefully tailored to meet the State's legitimate interests in protecting
former cohabitants from violence, from the threat of violence, and from unwanted
contact. Protective orders are available only (1) where a cohabitant "has been
subjected to abuse or domestic violence" or (2) where *'there is a substantial
likelihood of immediate danger of abuse or domestic violence." L'TAH CODE A W
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$ 30-6-2 (1996). The purpose for the protective order is, at least in part, "to avoid
further abuse." Id.

While a court may restrict all contact and communication

with an estranged partner, the statute is ''carefully tailored" to permit such
restnctions only where abuse has, in fact, occurred and/or a real danger of abuse is
present.
Further, the restriction on all contact and communication is appropriate to
prevent communication that may appear innocent, but in fact is not. The restriction
prevents manipulations by abusers to get their victims to drop protective orders and
other proceedings and to force reconciliation. Further, apparently innocent
communications, in the context of the domestic partners' history and past
conversations, may constitute veiled threats and/or harassment. A total ban is also
appropriate to prevent communications that—even if innocently begun—can
escalate into abuse. 6
Further, the State has a legitimate interest in "preserving the sanctity of the
home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from the
tribulations of their daily pursuits." Frisby v. Schultz. 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
"By prohibiting all contact and communication, the court also avoids the
constitutional difficulties that may be associated with prohibition of certain
communications on the basis of their content. See Rowan v. United States Post Office
Dep 7, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) ("Congress provided this sweeping power [permitting
Postmaster, at recipient's request, to prohibit further mailings from commercial sender]
not only to protect privacy but to avoid possible constitutional questions that might arise
from vesting the power to make any discretionary evaluation of the material in a
government official.").
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"One important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the unwilling listener."
Id. The United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly held that individuals are not
required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and that the
government may protect this freedom." Id. at 485.
Accordingly, individuals do not have an unfettered First Amendment right to
send letters to unwilling recipients. The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he right
of every person 'to be let alone' must be placed in the scales with the right o(
others to communicate." Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep V, 397 U.S. 728,
736 (1970) (upholding, against First Amendment challenge, a prohibition of all
further mailings after addressee requests that his name be removed from sender's
list). In the context of mailings, the Court has held that "a mailer's right to
communicate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee" and that ,w[t]o
hold less would tend to license a form of trespass." Id. at 736-737.
The statute at issue is not substantially or otherwise overly broad on its face.
It is carefully drawn to permit protective orders only where abuse is likely. The
restriction runs only to communications sent to the estranged partner. A total ban
on such communications is appropriate in the sphere of domestic conflict where
apparently innocuous communications may have threatening or harassing meanings,
where even innocent communication can quickly and unexpectedly trigger

">?
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dangerous behavior, and where the recipient has clearly communicated her desire
"to be let alone."
B.

Over breadth as applied to defendant
Further, the statute is not unconstitutionally broad as applied to defendant.

For the reasons stated above, protective orders prohibiting all conduct and
communication with a former cohabitant are permissible. Defendant was subject to
a total ban, and he violated the protective order when he attempted to circumvent
it. The court properly convicted him where he sent letters intended for Ms. Hardy,
even if the letters were mere "expressions of sorrow, remorse and devotion." Br.
Aplt. at 47.
VI.
DEFENDANT LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
STATUTE AS VAGUE ON ITS FACE; IN ANY EVENT, THE
STATUTE AND PROTECTIVE ORDERS ARE NOT VAGUE
Defendant claims that statute and protective orders in this case are
unconstitutionally vague. Br. Aplt. at 3 1. He argues that they do not adequately
specify what conduct is prohibited, apparently because they do not make provision
for the "inevitable" communication that may be necessary where one cohabitant has

A careful reading of the letters demonstrates that they contain accusations, blame,
and hostility—not mere expressions of remorse.
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custody of minor children and the other has visitation rights.s See id. at 34. He
also claims that the statutory provisions and orders are subject to selective
enforcement. Id. at 35. He argues that they allow a judge or jury to determine
"what is prohibited and who will be subjected to prosecution." Id. at 38-39.
Finally, he argues that the statute and orders are vague as applied because they did
not advise him that "communicating about Courtney would constitute an offense."
Id. at 35 (emphasis in original). He further claims that they left the jury to decide
"whether letters to the children about Courtney and about [his] feeling of sorrow
and apology should be penalized." See id. at 36-39.
As explained in points III and IV, above, defendant has not preserved this
issue in either the misdemeanor or felonies case Further, defendant has no
standing to allege that the statutory provisions are vague on their face. In any case,
neither the statutory provisions nor the protective orders are vague—either facially
or as applied.
A.

Facial vagueness

^

Due process requires that a statute define a criminal offense with "'sufficient
detlniteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Salt

x

In making this argument, defendant claims that the words directly, indirectly,
otherwise communicating, and contacting are so "general and expansive" that they
"embrace and penalize innocent conduct." Br. Aplt at 34.
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Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1265 (Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted). On
the other hand, due process does not require "mathematical certainty" from
statutory language. Grayned v. City ofRockford. 408 U.S. at 111. It need only
possess sufficient clarity to convey '"warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practices.'" State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d
1280, 1285 (Utah 1983). Further, the law must not "impermissibly delegate[] basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers o( arbitrary and discriminatory
application." Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-109.
I.

Standing
Defendant lacks standing to pursue his vagueness challenge. Utah has

adopted a three-stage standing analysis: (1) whether any vagueness in the statute
has adversely affected defendant; (2) whether there are litigants other than
defendant with a more direct interest in the issues; and (3) whether defendant raises
issues of sufficient public importance to grant standing. State v. Mace, 921 P.2d
1372, 1379 (Utah 1996). The Court considers the second stage only if defendant
cannot establish standing under the first, Id. If defendant cannot demonstrate
under the second stage that there exist no other litigants with a more direct interest
in the issues, then the Court does not consider the third stage.9 Id.

''Further, language in Young v. American Mini Theatres. Inc.. 427 U.S. 50, 58-59
(1976), suggests that the courts need not consider a facial challenge where "[i]t is

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

No one would dispute that the statutes and protective orders proscribed
defendant's communication with Ms. Hardy, even if his purpose was only to
convey "expressions of sorrow, remorse and devotion." Defendant also cannot
establish that no other litigants have a more direct interest in the outcome. Anyone
convicted of violating a protective order because he or she communicated with a
former partner about a visitation schedule or about a child's medical emergency
would have a more direct interest in litigating the issue.
2.

Merits
Alternatively, defendant's vagueness challenge fails on its merits. The statute

make clears that the subject of a protective order that prohibits his contact or
communication with a former cohabitant violates the law by contacting or
communicating with that former cohabitant. Further, this law was "written
specifically for" a "particular context," i.e., the domestic abuse context. See
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 112 (distinguishing an anti-noise ordinance applicable to
places adjacent to schools—"the school context"—from general breach of the
peace ordinances). Given its "'particular context," the [law] gives "fair warning to
those to whom [it] is directed/" Id. (quoting American Communications Ass n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950)). Further, nothing suggests that the law lacks
explicit standards to direct those who must apply it.

clear. . . that any element of vagueness in [the law] has not affected [the challenger]."
26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B.

Vagueness as applied
Defendant argues that the statutes and protective order were vague as applied

to him because he "was not advised that communicating about Courtney would
constitute an offense." Br. Aplt. at 35. Further, defendant argues that he was
subject to arbitrary and discnminatory enforcement because the trial court permitted
the jury "to decide whether the conduct in this case constituted a violation of the
protective order" and "whether the letters to the children about Courtney . . . should
be penalized." Id. at 36. Defendant misconstrues the proceedings below in making
this challenge.
First, defendant was given adequate notice. It was not necessary that
defendant be advised that communicating "about Courtney" would constitute an
offense. Communications to Ms. Hardy, not communications about her, were the
bases for defendant's felony convictions and for the finding that he had violated the
terms of his plea in abeyance.
Further, defendant was not subject to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Contrary to defendant's claim, the jury was not asked to decide whether the letters
to the children about Ms. Hardy should be penalized. Rather, the jury was asked to
decide whether defendant's letters, ostensibly to his children, were, in fact, letters
for Ms. Courtney and whether defendant had intentionally violated his protective
order by sending them. These were questions of fact, proper matters for jury
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resolution. See Utah R. Crim. P. l()(d) (stating that members of "the jury . . . are
the exclusive judges of all questions of fact"). Assuming the letters were for Ms.
Hardy, a determination had already been made—by the legislature—that such
communications, when proscribed by a protective order, should be penalized.
Defendant has not shown that the law in this case was facially vague or vague
as applied to him. His claim fails on the merits.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
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30-6-2. Abuse or danger of abuse - Protective orders.
(1) Any cohabitant or any child residing with a cohabitant who has been subjected to abuse or
domestic violence, or to whom there is a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse or
domestic violence, may seek an ex parte protective order or a protective order in accordance with this
chapter, whether or not that person has left the residence or the premises in an effort to avoid further
abuse.
(2) (a) A petition for a protective order may be filed under this chapter regardless of whether an
action for divorce between the parties is pending.
(b) If a complaint for divorce has already been filed in district court, a petition under this chapter
may be filed as part of the divorce proceedings.
(3) A cohabitant, the department, or any person or institution interested in a minor may seek a
protective order on behalf of the minor under the circumstances described in Subsection (1),
regardless of whether the minor could have filed a petition on his own behalf. If a cohabitant intends
to seek a protective order on his own behalf and on behalf of a minor, a single petition may be filed.
(4) The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the minor if the court considers the
appointment necessary for the welfare of the minor.
(5) The county attorney or district attorney, if appropriate, shall represent the department where
the department appears as a petitioner.
(6) A petition seeking a protective order may not be withdrawn without approval of the court.
Amended by Chapter 244, 1996 General Session
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30-6-4.2. Protective orders - Ex parte protective orders - Modification of orders - Sen ice
of process — Duties of the court.
(1) If it appears from a petition for an order for protection or a petition to modify an order for
protection that domestic violence or abuse has occurred or a modification of an order for protection is
required, a court may:
(a) without notice, immediately issue an order for protection ex parte or modify an order for
protection ex parte as it considers necessary to protect the petitioner and all parties named to be
protected in the petition: or
lb) upon notice, issue an order for protection or modify an order after a hearing, whether or not the
respondent appears.
(2) A court may grant the following relief without notice in an order for protection or a
modification issued ex parte:
(a) enjoin the respondent from threatening to commit or committing domestic violence or abuse
against the petitioner and any designated family or household member;
(b) prohibit the respondent from harassing, telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating
with the petitioner, directly or indirectly:
(c) order that the respondent is excluded from the petitioner's residence and its premises, and order
the respondent to stay away from the residence, school, or place of employment of the petitioner, and
the premises of any of these, or any specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated
family or household member:
(d) upon finding that the respondent's use or possession of a weapon may pose a serious threat o(
harm to the petitioner, prohibit the respondent from purchasing, using, or possessing a firearm or
other weapon specified by the court:
(e) order possession and use of an automobile and other essential personal effects, and direct the
appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to
ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to possession of the residence, automobile, and other
essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's removal of personal
belongings:
(f) grant temporary custody of any minor children to the petitioner;
(g) order any further relief that the court considers necessary to provide for the safety and welfare
of the petitioner and any designated family or household member; and
(h) if the petition requests child support or spousal support, at the hearing on the petition order
both parties to provide verification of current income, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer
statements of year-to-date or other period of earnings, as specified by the court, and complete copies
of tax returns from at least the most recent year.
(3) A court may grant the following relief in an order for protection or a modification o( an order
after notice and hearing, whether or not the respondent appears:
(a) grant the relief described in Subsection (2); and
(b) specify arrangements for parent-time of any minor child by the respondent and require
supervision of that parent-time by a third party or deny parent-time if necessary to protect the safety
of the petitioner or child.
(4) Following the protective order hearing, the court shall:
(a) as soon as possible, deliver the order to the county sheriff for service of process;
(b) make reasonable efforts to ensure that the order for protection is understood by the petitioner,
and the respondent, if present;
(O transmit, by the end of the next business day after the order is issued, a copy of the order for
protection to the local law enforcement agency or agencies designated by the petitioner: and
(d) transmit a copy of the order to the statewide domestic violence network described in Section
30-6-8.
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(5) (a) Each protective order shall include two separate portions, one for provisions, the Moiation
of which are criminal offenses, and one for provisions, the violation of which are civil violations, as
follows:
(i) criminal offenses are those under Subsections (2)(a) through (e), and under Subsection (3)(a) as
it refers to Subsections (2)(a) through (e); and
(ii) civil offenses are those under Subsections (2)(f) through (h). and Subsection (3)(a) as it refers
to Subsections (2)(f) through (h).
(b) The criminal provision portion shall include a statement that violation of any criminal
provision is a class A misdemeanor.
(c) The civil provision portion shall include a notice that violation of or failure to comply with a
civil provision is subject to contempt proceedings.
(6) The protective order shall include:
(a) a designation of a specific date, determined by the court, when the civil portion of the
protective order either expires or is scheduled for review by the court, which date may not exceed 150
days after the date the order is issued, unless the court indicates on the record the reason for setting a
date beyond 150 days;
(b) information the petitioner is able to provide to facilitate identification of the respondent, such
as social security number, driver license number, date of birth, address, telephone number, and
physical description; and
(c) a statement advising the petitioner that:
(i) after three years from the date of issuance of the protective order, a hearing may be held to
dismiss the criminal portion of the protective order;
(ii) the petitioner should, within the 30 days prior to the end of the three-year period, advise the
court of the petitioner's current address for notice of any hearing; and
(iii) the address provided by the petitioner will not be made available to the respondent.
(7) Child support and spouse support orders issued as part of a protective order are subject to
mandatory income withholding under Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 4, Income Withholding in IV-D
Cases, and Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 5, Income Withholding in Non IV-D Cases, except when the
protective order is issued ex parte.
(8) (a) The county sheriff that receives the order from the court, pursuant to Subsection (5)(a),
shall provide expedited service for orders for protection issued in accordance with this chapter, and
shall transmit verification of service of process, when the order has been served, to the statewide
domestic violence network described in Section 30-6-8.
(b) This section does not prohibit any law enforcement agency from providing service of process if
that law enforcement agency:
(i) has contact with the respondent and service by that law enforcement agency is possible: or
(ii) determines that under the circumstances, providing service of process on the respondent is in
the best interests of the petitioner.
(9) (a) When an order is served on a respondent in a jail or other holding facility, the law
enforcement agency managing the facility shall make a reasonable effort to provide notice to the
petitioner at the time the respondent is released from incarceration.
(b) Notification of the petitioner shall consist of a good faith reasonable effort to provide
notification, including mailing a copy of the notification to the last-known address of the victim.
(10) (a) A court may modify or vacate an order of protection or any provisions in the order after
notice and hearing, except as limited under Subsection (10)(b).
• (b) Criminal provisions of a protective order may not be vacated within three years of issuance
unless the petitioner:
(i) is personally served with notice of the hearing as provided in Rules 4 and 5. Utah Rules of
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Civil Procedure, and the petitioner personally appears before the court and gives specific consent to
the vacation of the criminal provisions of the protective order; or
(ii) submits a verified affidavit, stating agreement to the vacation of the criminal provisions of the
protective order.
(11) A protective order may be modified without a showing of substantial and material change in
circumstances.
(12) Insofar as the provisions of this chapter are more specific than the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, regarding protective orders, the provisions of this chapter govern.
Amended by Chapter 255, 2001 General Session
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76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another - Violation.
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective order or ex parte
protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 78. Chapter 3a.
Juvenile Court Act of 1996, Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign
protective order as described in Section 30-6-12, who intentionally or knowingly violates that order
after having been properly served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater penalty may
be provided in Title 77. Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act.
(2) Violation of an order-as described in Subsection (1) is a domestic violence offense under
Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased penalties in accordance with Section 77-36-1.1.
Amended by Chapter 246, 1999 General Session
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77-2a-3. Manner of entry of plea -- Powers of court.
(1) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation of a plea in abeyance agreement shall be done in full
compliance with the provisions of Rule 11. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may provide that the court may, upon finding that the defendant
has successfully completed the terms of the agreement:
(a) reduce the degree of the offense and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence for a
lower degree of offense; or
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant's plea and order the dismissal of the case.
(3) Upon finding that a defendant has successfully completed the terms of a plea in abeyance
agreement, the court shall reduce the degree of the offense, dismiss the case only as provided in the
plea in abeyance agreement or as agreed to by all parties. Upon sentencing a defendant for any lesser
offense pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may not invoke Section 76-3-402 to
further reduce the degree of the offense.
(4) The court may require the Department of Corrections to assist in the administration of the plea
in abeyance agreement as if the defendant were on probation to the court under Section 77-18-1.
(5) The court may upon acceptance of a plea in abeyance agreement and pursuant to the terms of
the agreement:
(a) order the defendant to pay a nonrefundable plea in abeyance fee. which shall be allocated in the
same manner as if it had been paid as a fine and shall not exceed in amount the maximum fine which
could have been imposed upon conviction and sentencing for the same offense;
(b) order the defendant to pay all or a portion of the costs of administration of the agreement;
(c) order the defendant to pay restitution to the victims of his actions as provided in Section 76-3201;
(d) order the defendant to pay the costs of any rehabilitative program required by the terms of the
agreement; and
(e) order the defendant to comply with any other conditions which could have been imposed as
conditions of probation upon conviction and sentencing for the same offense.
(6) A court may not hold a plea in abeyance without the consent of both the prosecuting attorney
and the defendant. A decision by a prosecuting attorney not to agree to a plea in abeyance is not
subject to judicial review.
(7) No plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a sexual offense against a victim who is
under the age of 14.
Amended by Chapter 301, 1995 General Session
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77-2a-4. Violation of plea in abeyance agreement — Hearing - Entry of judgment and
imposition of sentence — Subsequent prosecutions. (1) If. at any time during the term of the plea in
abeyance agreement, information comes to the attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that
the defendant has violated any condition of the agreement, the court, at the request of the prosecuting
attorney, made by appropriate motion and affidavit, or upon its own motion, may issue an order
requiring the defendant to appear before the court at a designated time and place to show cause why
the court should not find the terms of the agreement to have been violated and why the agreement
should not be terminated. If. following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the defendant has
failed to substantially comply with any term or condition of the plea in abeyance agreement, it may
terminate the agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the defendant
for the offense to which the original plea was entered. Upon entry of judgment of conviction and
imposition of sentence, any amounts paid by the defendant as a plea in abeyance fee prior to
termination of the agreement shall be credited against any fine imposed by the court.
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement and subsequent entry of judgment of
conviction and imposition of sentence shall not bar any independent prosecution arising from any
offense that constituted a violation of any term or condition of an agreement whereby the original
plea was placed in abeyance.
Enacted by Chapter 82, 1993 General Session
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77-36-1.1. Enhancement of penalty for subsequent domestic violence offenses.
(1) When an offender is convicted of any domestic violence offense in Utah, or is convicted in any
other state, or in any district, possession, or territory of the United States, of an offense that would be
a domestic violence offense under Utah law, and is within a five-year period after the conviction
subsequently charged with a domestic violence offense that is a misdemeanor, the offense charged
and the punishment for that subsequent offense may be enhanced by one degree above the offense
and punishment otherwise provided in the statutes described in Section 77-36-1.
(2) For purposes of this section, a plea in abeyance is considered a conviction.
Amended by Chapter 296, 1999 General Session
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Rule 12. Motions.
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion other than one made during
a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the court otherwise permits. It shall state with particularity
the grounds upon wrhich it is made and shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported by
affidavit or by evidence.
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence,
which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by
written motion. The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial:
(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information other than that it fails to
show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at
any time during the pendency of the proceeding;
(2) motions to suppress evidence;
(3) requests for discovery where allowed;
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or
(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court for good cause orders
that the ruling be deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are involved in determining a
motion, the court shall state its findings on the record.
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be
made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for
cause shown may grant relief from such waiver.
(e) Except injustices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceedings at the hearing on
motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions of law as are made orally.
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the prosecution or in the
indictment or information, it may also order that bail be continued for a reasonable and specified time
pending the filing of a new indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations.
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